It's an old custom.

The scapegoat was a goat that was driven off into the wilderness as part of the ceremonies of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, in Judaism during the times of the Temple in Jerusalem. The rite is described in Leviticus 16.

The word is more widely used as a metaphor, referring to someone who is blamed for misfortunes, generally as a way of distracting attention from the real causes. . .

Since this goat, carrying the sins of the people placed on it, is sent away to perish [5], the word "scapegoat" has come to mean a person, often innocent, who is blamed and punished for the sins, crimes, or sufferings of others.

In some developing countries democracy is the scapegoat.

Traditional theories of democratization, such as those of Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, predict a story of middle class heroics: As a country develops a true middle class, these urban, educated citizens insist on more rights in order to protect their economic and social interests. Eventually, as the size of the middle class grows, those demands become so overwhelming that democracy is inevitable. But now, it appears, the middle class in some nations has turned into an antidemocratic force. Young democracy, with weak institutions, often brings to power, at first, elected leaders who actually don't care that much about upholding democracy. As these demagogues tear down the very reforms the middle classes built, those same middle classes turn against the leaders, and then against the system itself, bringing democracy to collapse.

This is a process now being repeated in Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America, regions that once seemed destined to become the third and fourth waves of global democratization, following the original Western democracies and the second wave in southern Europe and several other regions. The pattern has become so noticeable - repeated in Venezuela, Russia, Bangladesh, and other states - that one must even wonder about democracy's future itself.

Democracy is of little value unless it is supported by a culture with strong internal institutions, and it is a threat to society unless it is severely constrained to prevent populist hijacking.

But what many theorists didn't count on was that middle class excitement could turn sour. In 2000, Thailand's middle class faced a problem it might not have anticipated - a politician who actually canvassed the poor for votes. Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire telecommunications tycoon turned pol, traveled the rural hinterlands, spewing populist promises unlike anything the country had ever seen: cheap, government-backed healthcare, loans to every village, and many more. When I traveled with Thaksin on the campaign trail, villagers welcomed him like a kind of god, gathering in packs to listen and try to touch him. And the rural poor, who make up the majority of the country, voted. In 2001, and again in 2005, Thaksin swept elections, winning far greater control of parliament than any previous prime minister.

But Thaksin then used his power to undermine the opposition parties, attack media outlets he did not like, and even launch a "war on drugs" in which more than 2,000 people were killed, including many innocents with political links. "People just disappear every night - we never see them again. People here are terrified just to go to sleep," said Hama, a community activist in southern Thailand, where the killings and disappearances have hit hard. (Hama goes by one name.)

Thaksin was only following a charted course in new democracies that can't yet stand up to "elected dictators." In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez has employed a similar strategy, using his elected power to increasingly muzzle opposition. (Chavez, though, recently overstepped by trying to pass a referendum to change the constitution, which was defeated.) Across sub-Saharan Africa, from Nigeria to Rwanda, many leaders, the first generation of democratically elected presidents, also have turned out to be less than democrats. In Rwanda, president Paul Kagame has amassed so much power that, in its most recent annual report on the country, Human Rights Watch warned of a litany of abuses, including "harsh official repression," disappearances, and unexplained political killings. In Nigeria, supposed reformer Olusegun Obasanjo, elected after years of military coups, used his time in his office to attempt to change the constitution to give him more terms, and then to install a man in power loyal to him. So, too, in Central Asia, where even Kyrgyzstan, once the region's democratic hope, has turned increasingly authoritarian.

Most dangerously, in Russia, where weak democracy in the 1990s built few checks and balances, Vladimir Putin has utilized a blend of populism and nationalism to essentially install himself as an elected dictator. And unlike many of these other nations, Russia can serve as an example - as a powerful, relatively rich authoritarian state under Putin, it has funded NGOs across Central Asia, most of which in theory are designed to promote democracy, but whose true function is to help established rulers push back against democrats in those nations.

I've often written about confusing majoritarianism with democracy. They aren't the same thing at all. Majoritarianism is merely mob rule. Democracy is not about being ruled, it is about self governance, perpetual vigilance to prevent rulers from coming to have great power. The existence of such a plum as power to rule will inevitably attract villains. Once they have power they proceed to entrench themselves and self governance is eliminated. Those who make great noise about the importance of elections to install their favored would-be ruler fail to grasp that philosopher kings of symbolic importance don't endure. Eventually, inevitably, a villain will be elected and then all that focused power will be diverted to the purposes of the dictator.

Democracy is being scapegoated, blamed for the sins of majoritarianism and poorly designed republics that lack necessary limits to power based on the strong internal institutions of well developed cultures.