Jeremy notes that African ag is slow to adopt improved methods and that there are international efforts in progress to make better methods and materials - especially seed, fertilizer, and know-how - easier to get. He would prefer alternative approaches.

. . . would an equal investment in extension services be a better use of the money? Countries tend to be neglecting extension right now, possibly because they are lured by technological solutions that are more glamorous than spreading best practices. What if there were a transnational service that put an army of barefoot extension workers into the countryside? Equip them with a bicycle and some communications technology. Give them access to one another’s experience and a global network of experts. Give them access, too, to those technological developments, if they think those are worthwhile. Maybe even give farmers vouchers that they can exchange for advice.

Historically and logically no solution is sustainable that depends on perpetual external funding, or that depends on centralized institutions.

Extension services work when they are controlled and funded locally. Otherwise, not. It's a matter of incentives and allegiance. An extension agent hired and paid or otherwise employed at the will of outsiders has no incentive to serve local needs, even when that is the job description. But how do qualified agents come to exist in localities where there is a skill deficit? The most skilled locals could help others to be better, but it is small improvement compared to need, and would be less likely to increase use of improved methods and materials, so yields would still be low and hunger high.

Similarly, an agro-dealer network has incentives and allegiances that are not completely aligned with locals, but they are paid by locals and that matters. No sale, no pay. In that sense they are a little better than extension agents managed from outside, but less than might be possible.

Sustainable systems are evolved rather than created. Skilled locals who develop new skills in association with agro-dealers can be seen as hybrids, a cross between an agent and a dealer. Sometimes they are called consultants. Some take part of their pay as fee for service, and part from commissions on product recommendations. The incentives and allegiances are split but they are further constrained by the need to maintain reputation. They can't make bad recommendations and expect to be patronized in future since growers would have no way to pay. No crop, no pay.

ITC's e-choupal system used in India is an approach that has had some success. An e-choupal is a computer rigged with a small satellite dish, usually housed in a modest shed or kiosk in a location accessible by a community. Farmers pose questions that are e-mailed to agricultural scientists and experts at agricultural institutes. ITC profits from product sales and as a broker for ag commodities. Growers have improved yields and get better prices for their increased produce since they now know what is a fair market price.

Everyone prospers, but ITC could pull the plug. The idea is sustainable, but the implementation would be better if the network was open, and remote advisors are hampered by lack of direct experience at a location. There may be a use for agents who help growers compose questions. Good questions are at least as important as good answers, and local agents could do outreach to help more growers.

In other words, ag is the same everywhere. Parts of Africa are starting from an impoverished level, but the problem isn't unique. The experiences of other post-colonial nations - such as the USA - are relevant. The technologies have advanced since the US development period, but the social and organizational issues are much the same. One thing is clear, and Wendell Berry said it well:

Is it credible that people inadequately skilled and inadequately motivated to care well for the land can be made to care well for it by public insistence that they do so?

The answer is obvious: you cannot get good care in the use of the land by demanding it from public officials. That you have the legal right to demand it does not at all improve the case. . . Duty is not enough. Sentiment is not enough. No mere law, divine or human, could conceivably be enough to protect the land while we are using it.

If we want the land to be cared for, then we must have people living on and from the land who are able and willing to care for it.

Whatever the details of the system, it only works when all of the players have skin in the game. Duty, sentiment, good intentions, whatever are no substitute for at risk personal engagement. Any proposal for Africa that violates reality will not be sustainable and probably won't be of any use at all.

Update:

The link to the Berry essay, Private Property and the Common Wealth, was one I had used in the past but it rotted. Here's a fresh one. Fixed above too.

Update:

The cross-blog discussion continues at Another Blasted Weblog.