Muck and Mystery
   Loitering With Intent
blog - at - crumbtrail.org
November 09, 2005
Paris Is Burning

And there are as many theories about why this is so as there are pundits. . . OK, more. I found this Frank Furedi article to be thoughtful. After dismissing several other explanations (economic, yada yada) he proposes his theory.

The most significant thing about recent events in France is not the behaviour of the rioters, but the reaction of the political class and official authority. The Bush regime's response to the flooding of New Orleans looks positively energetic when compared with the sense of paralysis and confusion that seems to have gripped French officialdom.

During the first week of the unrest, French politicians devoted their energies mainly to scoring points against one another. Nero fiddling away while Rome burned seemed to serve as a role model for the French Cabinet. For a whole week, President Jacques Chirac literally withdrew from the public domain and said nothing. . .

This reluctance publicly to address the issue at stake is not peculiar to the French politician. One of the clearest manifestations of today's sense of political exhaustion is our elites' desperate desire to avoid discussing uncomfortable problems. . .

The French elite lacks purpose and is politically exhausted. As I argue in greater detail in my new book Politics of Fear, for the first time in the modern era the European political elites lack a project. They no longer have a mission to perform, and do not possess a distinct outlook that can inform their policies and day-to-day actions.

In recent decades, these elites have embraced the EU and sought to cobble together a European identity that might render public life with some meaning. However, this elitist managerial project lacks the capacity to inspire the public. The rejection of the EU Constitution in France and Holland earlier this year clearly demonstrated this technocratic institution's lack of legitimacy. . .

What the events in France demonstrate is that power means very little without purpose. Power and authority gain definition through a sense of direction. Without meaning, even the power of the military and the police loses much of its force. And the more this powerlessness becomes exposed, the more it encourages those who are estranged from society to have a go. This is not simply a case of official incompetence, but rather points to an elite that no longer believes in the legitimacy of its own authority and way of life. The way in which this crisis of belief has been intensely amplified through the French media has been one of the main drivers of the recent unrest. But don't blame the media: their cynical criticism of French authority is quietly shared by those who wield power. By letting the cat out of the bag, the French media simply transmit the message that politics lacks meaning.

I'm reminded of the pathetic article by Michael Lind criticized in Ship Of Fools that lamented the lack of an American elite - mandarins to guide society like they have in, err, France. I'm often amazed at the utter detachment from reality demonstrated by those such as Lind. They seem to live in a complete fantasy world - a video game based on simplistic notions of social and economic dynamics, riddled with assumptions that have no connection with reality at all.

Furedi seems far more on target with his observation that the European elites have been at sea with no rudder for some time, and that empty bureaucratic exercises like the EU constitution fail to engage society. I might add that UN boosterism, the Kyoto protocol and similar extravaganzas of the political and media complex have also failed to provide some sort of coherent meaning. They are all politics for the sake of politics, an essentially content free discourse reflective of much of continental intellectual life. They aren't about anything. The collapse of communism, unionism and to a great extent class politics in general has undermined the left but provided no true boost to the right. The air just went out of the conflict. Politics has gone flat. Furedi notes some particularly French consequences.

The marginalisation of the labour movement is paralleled by the decline of coherence within the French elite. . . Since the end of the Cold War, it has become much less clear what France's global role might be. Its claim to act as the leader of Europe has been undermined by the expansion of the EU and the decline of the French-German axis. Indeed, the rejection of the EU Constitution by the French electorate this year indicated that Europe can no longer serve as a rallying call to the French. In the absence of the Gaullist mission, domestic politics has descended into farce. Party politics has lost its way. Chirac is no De Gaulle: he presides over a political system where cliques of individuals fight for office and privilege and little else. . .

The cumulative effect of the loss of meaning in France, and the undermining of the elite's authority, is the intensification of conflicts and divisions. The people that live in the immigrant suburbs of Paris not only lack access to resources - they are also profoundly estranged from the values and way of life associated with France. The youngsters torching cars and burning down their schools have no distinct political project or objective. They are not driven by social perspective or an Islamist ideology - at least not yet. They simply desire the kind of French prosperity that they see on the other side of the tracks, but without wanting to be associated with any idea of France.

To put it bluntly: there are no French values to share. In the absence of a common web of meaning, even small differences can turn into a major conflict. In such circumstances, there is every incentive to inflate suspicion and magnify difference. That is the politics of today, and probably of tomorrow.

That's bleak. There's truth in it but I don't think things are as hopeless as Furedi does. His error is in not understanding the diversity issue. He says:
The current state of political exhaustion shows that public life lacks a sense of purpose, perspective and meaning. Most government policies try to get around this problem by avoiding it. The celebration of diversity is probably the clearest example of such an evasive strategy. Celebrating the many is a meaningless act that simply recognises the reality that we are not all the same. It is as vacuous as the worship of one or a few. Diversity is a statement of fact - and to turn a fact into an ideal is to avoid having real ideals altogether.
Diversity is a fact, one that was papered over with the false unity of class conflict during the cold war era. "Celebrating" diversity isn't just cheerful chatter and bad public art, it is a refocusing of the social mind on itself and a challenge to alter institutions to better meet the needs of that reality. It explicitly refutes what Furedi seems to long for - meaning, values, unity and political projects. It exposes the truth that politics is stupid, an empty exercise in power arbitrage that only benefits the elites. Non-elites would be far better off directing their energy and passion to exercises with more meaning, such as football and Sumo wresting.

As the world comes to fully grasp the fact of diversity and its implications for governance it will have to kick the politics habit since it is an impediment to governance. There are few programs and policies that can be implemented on a large scale that are not unacceptably injurious to some groups in a large and diverse polity. There are few bold programs on any scale that do not cause great harm to some. The whole idea of collateral damage - the need to break eggs to make omelettes - is a childish vestige of a simple minded past that failed to grasp the fact of diversity. As we at long last face the implications of having filled the earth with our diverse selves, and that far from yearning for unity we take far greater pleasure in local differentiation, something that we actively promote and seek to enlarge at every opportunity, ideas based in fully implemented subsidiarity will come to be far more important. The focus of each locality will be on preventing any remote power from dominating.

There is danger in this if not understood and accepted. This may well be the last task for the elites, for public intellectuals and the mandarin class. If the need for freedom and diversity is not accepted with grace a war of all against all is possible. This means that all of our institutions, all of our steam age instincts, need reform. The mass-consciousness ideals of uniformity and global governance are the cherished illusions of youth, and we are far too old for such childish diversions. The elites and intellectuals can in part redeem themselves for decades of counter-productive wanking that in the end had no purpose other than the preservation of the perquisites of intimate tyrannies in their own narrow institutions by helping the world to understand and accept more mature views. The empty gyrations of French politics that Furedi laments - "a political system where cliques of individuals fight for office and privilege and little else" - isn't merely French. It is the decadent phase of nearly every institution since they have all lost meaning. The French are just an extreme case of a general collapse of old fashioned ways.

When we consider some of the surrounding issues to these recent riots in Europe - Iraq, Islam, unemployment, youth demographics, class conflict etc. - and illuminate them with the concept of the end of politics quite a few popular notions dissolve. The idea that the collapse of communism - and thus class war, unionism and unity of nearly every sort - and the triumph of liberal democracy seems off the mark. Liberal democracy didn't triumph, it just hasn't fallen yet. It held on a bit longer because it does offer more liberty, accomodates more diversity, but it is reaching its breaking point too.

The liberal part will survive, but we need a sharp rethink of what democracy means, a full retreat from the error of equating democracy with majoritarianism and seeking to continually enlarge the scope and scale of political entities ruled by majorities. All that does is continually enlarge the number of people in the minority and disenfranchised to an increasing extent. The callous rejoinder that they are free to try to become the majority, free to persuade others to their point of view, completely fails to grasp the central defect of majoritarianism: No matter who wins huge numbers lose. The cumulative resentment and cynicism of majoritarian ideas is one of the fuels that is lighting up Paris now.

No one benefits from this system except politicians and bureaucrats - the mandarins and eunuchs who hold power and status. As the speed and scope of communications grows in a networked world all of the disenfranchised minorities will become aware of one another's plights. There may be hell to pay if it dawns on them all that even when they struggle and persuade and come to dominate that they didn't reduce the number of disenfranchised. Only the particulars changed. This is a dumb way to run a world. There really isn't any reason to have large and powerful political groupings. They exist because they exist. The purpose of each is only to counter the presence of the other, each inflamed with the old ideas of unity, conquest and enlarged domain. We have grown too old and the world has become too small for such callow systems.

Posted by back40 at 07:11 AM | politics

TrackBack URL for Paris Is Burning - http://www.garyjones.org/cgi-bin/mt/mt-tb1.cgi/202


Comments

Glad to see you back in the Muck & Mystery. What happened to the Crumb Trail? I keep coming up zeroes when I look for it.

I am reminded of a letter that James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson on October 17, 1788.

Jefferson was in Paris, in the year before the French Revolution. Madison was in America, after the American Revolution, contemplating whether or not to support a Bill of Rights, amendments to the Constitution, he considered unnecessary in principle, but perhaps necessary in practice:

Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the major number of its constituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to: and is probably more strongly impressed on my mind by facts, and reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter.

Madison was politely suggesting that Jefferson was perhaps concerned about the abuses of an ancien regime, while Madison was saying, that Americans were more concerned about abuses of the, pardon my French, nouveau regime: democracy.

As is your wont, you seem to have put your fingers on a number of live wires here. (Sorry for the electric metaphor, but what happened with the lightning anyway? I have been thinking of you and Benjamin Franklin lately.)

Madison's Federalist 10, written around the same time, turned Montesquieu's conception that the only good republic was a small republic on its head, by arguing that enlarging the republic was the best way to ensure that extreme factions would cancel themselves out and make it harder to form majorities that would oppress minorities.

You seem to be exploring the implications of a wired world where the ease of scaling has complicated, if not reversed, this formulation. It is easier for larger and larger majorities to form, and at the same time, it is easier for minorities to coalesce, using the same tools of communication, the world wide web. It is like the perfect storm of factional arms races.

There were and will continue to be good reasons for larger communities and political groupings to form, as majorities and minorities.

But there are some important threads to think through here. On the one hand, despite the primeavel ability of natural forces, such as lightning for example, to zap one node or another, this distributed means of communication seems to have perhaps pulled the rug out from under the Madisonian reasoning which has served us fairly well.

On the other hand, is there any way to usefully employ this reasoning, which is an important part of our republican and democratic (small "r," small "d") intellectual legacy, to find ways to live with the inevitable formation of factions in this ever more closely connected world?

Posted by: Jon Christensen at November 10, 2005 08:27 PM

Well, I think that Madison was wrong then too. He was right that "there is the danger of oppression. . . from acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the major number of its constituents", but his prescription to enlarge the republic to neutralize competing extreme factions didn't fit the diagnosis.

The confusion, I think, is relevant to current events. The most interesting discussions of the propriety of regime change in Iraq are those that involve careful humanitarian thinkers such as Norm who cling to the older progressive interventionist view that we have a kind of moral obligation to liberate those who are oppressed. In a sense Madison was working the same beat, trying to prevent local oppression of minorities by subsuming localities into a larger republic.

It doesn't work. It can't work. So long as any majority is considered legitimate while any of its constituent minorities feel oppressed, whether those in the majority empathize or not, the system is a sham that merely exchanges one kind of oppression for another. It isn't whether or not people are oppressed, they argue, it is how they are oppressed. Bunk! That's a prescription for riots.

Consider the French problems and the general dissatisfaction with the European Social Model. Some of the same issues exist in Japan too. The chief defect is "social death". You may have a safety net, welfare payments and rationed health care but you don't have a job. You have no career, no status, no place in society, no respect, no prospects and so no life. You are a dead man walking, a rider of the purple wage, a "shitter". Worse, you are watched and regulated tightly, your freedoms are defined and limited to those that the majority considers sufficient, that satisfy their views of an "adequate" existence.

Berlin's negative and positive liberty ideas come into play here. Madison, and those who would seek to use government to perfect society, accept and promote limitations on some liberties in order to allow other liberties. As the scale of a society increases the limitations increase too since it encompasses an ever more diverse set of people. There is a limit to the utility of this approach.


It is only when, as Furedi notes, there is some grand plan, some engaging scheme to artificially weld a diverse society together and paper over different aspirations that large systems work. When there is no threat, no danger, nothing to strain against, the society falls flat on its face. It needs enemies to lean against in order to maintain its unbalanced forward leaning posture. When there is no external threat the plucky primates are free to resume squabbling with one another.

It's a silly system. We don't need great societies and world systems. We don't like monocultures whether they are achieved though ersatz multi-culturalism or the multi-ethnic approach of France. Every generation throws a hero at the pop charts. If nothing else you can rest assured that the next generation will oppose the last because there is a drive to differentiate, to become more diverse, even if every locality was an identical cell in a hive. They aren't of course, so the drive to diversity is huge and varied.

You might be able to relate this to some of the island biodiversity heresies of late and the rise of sympatric speciation as a credible source of biological diversity. You don't need isolation, you only need opportunity, and sex selection if nothing else will provide a ratchet to step away from the herd bit by bit until you are something else. Everything interesting is on the border between order and chaos, between uniformity and diversity. The one thing this guarantees is change.

What sort of governance systems address these realities? I've argued, as have others, that a more sophisticated understanding of democracy is required. It's not about voting and majorities, it's about self rule. The purpose of the agora is to become aware of what others think, to learn what must not be done, what they think is intolerable. Deliberation does not mean arriving at a consensus. Consensus is not possible except in trivial cases involving small and homogenous groups. It's tribal thinking. Deliberation is the process of shedding cherished illusions and grand schemes for perfecting society based on parochial views. Governance of this sort is very limited since there are few things that can be done that don't oppress significant minorities.

In the past this sort of more humane governance was too weak to fight external threats. It would have invited conquest by grasping neighbors not yet so evolved. The necessity for maintaing national defense made it impossible to govern well. Perhaps this too shall pass. Perhaps the end of the cold war and the collapse of the socialist dream of world conquest heralds a growing understanding that conquest isn't useful any longer, not now that we have good and fast communication. You can't really get away with anything and all can hear the cries of the oppressed.

So, the two major sources of oppression - internal and external - are outed at the speed of light. This won't end oppression quickly, nothing can do that, but it has painted a huge message on the wall announcing the future. Now all the powers and pundits need to focus on reality and imagine institutions that fit. It won't be quick - evangelists are slow to learn anything - but I expect progress to proceed funeral by funeral as the old guard dies off one by one over the coming decades. The alternatives are ugly and violent. I suppose my expectations are really just hopes. I hope that the old notions of perfectibility and squeamishness about individual bizarreness and failure fade away. We're a diverse lot of some of us make silly choices and have stupid enthusiasms. Some of us do much better. When all have the liberty to pursue their enthusiasms the net achievement exceed that of controlled systems that seek improvement through regulation and uniformity.

Re: parenthetic meta question. I'll e you tomorrow or so.

Posted by: back40 at November 10, 2005 11:15 PM

I was wondering about Crumb Trail too.

BTW, Furedi has a very complicated ideological history, not that this need lead you to regard his specific arguments as any less useful.

Posted by: Timothy Burke at November 17, 2005 12:22 PM

That whole magazine and most if not all of its contributors have complicated histories. In most cases, like with this Furedi article, I find that they are interested in things that matter to me and take positions that are insightfully contrary to much standard punditry, but that I'm differently skewed in some way than they are. In this case I thought that Furedi missed the gist of diversity and made a post out of that lack.

The Crumb Trail domain name is fubar. I may be able to fix it for a price I can pay. I've been negligent, intoxicated with work, and need to clean up my act a bit. I have a post-in-progress that deals with your academic bloggers post that I may finish this year;->

Posted by: back40 at November 17, 2005 12:49 PM

See this post for someone else's discovery of Furedi's complicated ideological history.

Posted by: back40 at November 17, 2005 05:53 PM
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